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6 Water allocation in transboundary 
river  systems in times of  c l imate 
change 
P. Michael Link 
A b s t r a c t  
Rivers are the lifelines for large shares of the global population Now climate 
change adds uncertainty to water availability in many transboundary river sys-
tems, making it hard or impossible for some countries to comply with existing 
treaties and affecting societal stability. In our research within CliSAP, we have 
developed a theoretical framework for the assessment of water conflict and cooper-
ation in times of climate change. The framework links environmental change to 
altered water availability. This in turn has effects on individual human wellbeing 
in the riparian countries. 
One case study that has been our particular focus is the Nile River Basin. Results 
indicate that Egypt’s water allocation goals can not be met in a business-as-usual 
scenario, increasing the likelihood of the downstream countries engaging in con-
flicting strategies with their upstream neighbors. 
KEYWORDS: Transboundary rivers, water management, climate change, Nile 
River Basin, agent-based modeling. 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
Since the beginning of civilization, humans have settled close to rivers to use their wa-
ter for consumption, agriculture, provision of food, and as means for transportation. 
The first cities have developed along large rivers and even today, transboundary rivers 
are of particular economic and strategic importance. However, pronounced growth of 
metropolitan areas along rivers has created challenges in recent decades that have 
made water a scarce resource in some river basins, particularly where other sources of 
freshwater are lacking. This has led to diminishing per capita water availability, a trend 
that is presumably intensified by the effects of climate change, which impact the water 
availability in river systems by affecting precipitation patterns and evaporation rates 
(Field and Van Aalst 2014; Stocker et al. 2014) 
The necessity to share river water among several riparian countries creates ad-
ditional caveats as downstream countries are dependent on sufficient fresh water 
inflow from the upstream riparians both quantitatively and qualitatively. There are 
263 transboundary river systems in the world that serve as freshwater source for 
more than 40 % of the world’s population (Wolf 1998). Adequate water allocation 
schemes usually require some kind of agreement between riparians and indeed 
agreements exist for practically all transboundary river systems. Nonetheless, con-
flict potentials remain if the riparians have distinctly different water use interest and 
histories of conflict and distrust. 
Water conflicts can be caused by a variety of factors, including unilateral utiliza-
tion of water by upstream countries (Bernauer and Siegfried 2012; Fischhendler, Di-
nar, and Katz 2011) or generally increasing water stress (Wolf 1999b). However, it has 
to be noted that despite recurring tensions and disputes over water resources in trans-
boundary rivers, there has been only one interstate war over water in recorded history, 
which already dates back several millennia (Wolf 1998). Currently, water disputes are 
usually embedded in tensions and disagreements about other political or economic is-
sues, so they play only a marginal role at the interstate level. Instead, cooperative use 
of water resources may benefit all riparians and could serve as foundation for cooper-
ation with regard to other aspects as well (Conca 2002). 
In order to be able to assess the interaction of physical and socio-economic aspects 
of water use in transboundary river systems, we have developed an integrated concep-
tual framework of water conflict or cooperation that takes into account issues of water 
management and changes in environmental conditions. It is applied exemplarily to the 
Nile River Basin, one of the key case study areas in the work of the Research Group 
Climate Change and Security on water resources. Possible development pathways can 
be identified not only by theoretical analyses but also by model simulations. Key in-
sights are discussed and summarized in the conclusion. 
 Water allocation in transboundary river systems in times of climate change 105 
 
M a n a g e m e n t  of  t r a n s b o u n d a r y  r i v e r  s y s t e m s  
The distribution of river water among the riparians is no trivial matter in many of the 
world’s transboundary river systems. History shows that conflicts have arisen in all 
river basins that could only be solved by some kind of agreement. The Transboundary 
Freshwater Dispute Database contains information on historic water conflicts and al-
lows for detailed assessments of causes and consequences (Wolf 1999a). 
With regard to the case study area, the Nile River Basin, it becomes evident that 
there is no simple relationship between the various physical and socio-economic driv-
ers, water availability, and the potential for conflict. Environmental change can lead to 
altered resource abundance affecting economic wealth, which in turn could translate 
into a higher potential for conflict onset (Link et al. 2012). First of all, climate change is 
an external forcing that impacts the availability of key resources such as water or land 
for agricultural production. This affects human wellbeing and – due to the trans-
boundary nature of the river basin – interstate relationships, which can be affected ei-
ther cooperatively or in a conflictive manner. The likelihood of conflict onset can be 
limited as long as all riparians have an adequate adaptive capacity to deal with the ex-
ternal change. 
Already existing agreements on water use can provide a useful setting for fur-
ther cooperation among riparians or be a burden as in the case of the Nile River, 
where water agreements are outdated and neglect a majority of the riparians of the 
river basin. Egypt has historically established itself as a hydro-hegemon, requiring 
the majority of the river water (Zeitoun and Warner 2006). Because of substantial 
external support by Great Britain in colonial times, Egypt became the dominating 
country in the region with regard to power and exploitation potential, offsetting its 
inferior geographic position. 
Current water allocation in the Nile River Basin is based on two key treaties, one 
from 1929 between the colonial United Kingdom, Egypt, and Sudan (Cascão 2009) 
and one from 1959. The latter became necessary due to the construction of the Aswan 
High Dam and allocated practically all water of the Nile River to the countries of Su-
dan and Egypt, implicitly leaving no water to the upstream countries. This agree-
ment has sparked substantial disputes between the upstream countries, particularly 
Ethiopia, and the downstream countries that want to maintain this agreement as 
long as possible (Link et al. 2012). 
Strong economic development in the upstream countries of the Nile River Basin 
and the construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia are substantial chal-
lenges to Egypt’s status as hydro-hegemon. After completion, the reservoir can take up 
considerable amounts of water from the Blue Nile, potentially significantly reducing 
Nile water flows downstream (Link and Scheffran 2015). Furthermore, energy produc-
tion from the dam is supposed to make Ethiopia less dependent on energy from the 
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surrounding countries and it should provide Ethiopia with additional income from en-
ergy sales to its neighbors. Egypt strictly opposes any reductions in water availability 
but it is unlikely that this dispute will cause a war for water, as such a military conflict 
could not be financed by Egypt and the result would be questionable at best (Gebreluel 
2014). Instead, the shift in power balance in the Nile River Basin could be a basis for 
new kinds of cooperation. Initially, a new agreement considering the capacities of all 
reservoirs could be drafted, which could be subsequently extended for further cooper-
ation among riparians (Bastawesy 2014). 
In other transboundary river systems, challenges to existing power structures 
have generally led to increased efforts for cooperation as well. It will be interesting 
to see whether this trend can be upheld if water stress increases considerably by pos-
sible reductions in supply due to climate change – by effects on precipitation and 
evaporation – and concurrent increases in demand due to population growth and 
further economic development. 
I m p l i c a t i o n s  of  c l i m a t e  c h a n g e  
Changes in environmental conditions in transboundary rivers occur as a combination 
of impacts of climate change as well as economic development and demographic 
change in many parts of the world, not only affecting water supply and demand but 
also water quality (de Stefano et al. 2012; Schellnhuber et al. 2013). Global warming may 
not only limit the water supply to river systems but also increase demand by affecting 
the amounts needed for human consumption and agricultural irrigation (Tir and Stin-
nett 2012). Increased evaporation with concurrent reductions in rainfall is likely to 
cause declines in river flows, reduced percolation into aquifers, and degradation of 
soils. In the long run, the frequency and amplitude of extreme events such as floods or 
droughts is expected to increase, which places an additional strain on the adaptive ca-
pacities of countries to cope with such changes (Field and Van Aalst 2014). Particularly, 
the melting of glaciers affects the water balance of rivers, increasing their flow in the 
coming years while declining substantially afterwards. 
When water availability changes as a consequence of climate change, impacts 
will not be homogeneously distributed among all riparians of transboundary rivers. 
Countries with a geographic disadvantage, i. e. the downstream countries, are likely 
to be affected to a larger extent than their upstream neighbors. Already existing con-
flicts about water distribution may be aggravated, possibly increasing the frequency 
and intensity of disputes. Nonetheless, it is still possible for riparians to cooperate 
on water utilization, particularly if the necessary institutional setting is already in 
place (Brochmann and Hensel 2011; Mianabadi, Mostert, and van de Giesen 2015; Tir 
and Stinnett 2012). These include new approaches in the design of water treaties, 
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which include adjustable allocation strategies, the focus on water quality as well as 
on quantities, strategies to address extreme events, review procedures, and joint in-
stitutions for water management (Cooley and Gleick 2011). 
However, it has to be noted that the interactions in the water-security nexus are 
complex and climate change adds to already existing fears of growing water scarcity in 
many transboundary river systems. This may prompt a continued securitization or 
militarization of water resources, eventually inducing new water conflicts in the future 
(Feitelson, Tamimi, and Rosenthal 2012; McDonald 2013). In contrast, it is also con-
ceivable that policy makes use of climate change in general – regardless of the actual 
regional impact on the hydrological setting – to promote cooperative measures among 
riparians by fostering trust, mutual understanding, and reconciliation (Amster 2013; 
Ide and Scheffran 2014). 
F r a m e w o r k  fo r  t h e  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  w a t e r  c o n f l i c t s  
A conceptual framework of the water-security nexus can be a helpful tool to assess the 
complexity of the interactions between the physical and socio-economic aspects of wa-
ter supply and the political and institutional dimensions of water use. All of these affect 
societal stability and possible conflict onset at multiple scales (Scheffran et al. 2012a, 
2012b). The framework developed by the Research Group Climate Change and Security 
considers the linkages between environmental and demographic change, their im-
pacts on water resources, the relationship between water stress and human security, 
the responses of key actors, and the institutional setting of water management and 
conflict resolution (Link, Scheffran, and Ide 2016). Key pathways and cascades of ef-
fects connect the three main compartments that are interlinked by causal relationships 
and feedback loops (Fig. 1). Based on the development of the physical drivers on water 
resources that interact with socio-economic drivers, impacts on security are assessed. 
This includes both individual human security as well as international security. The 
framework also addresses how water security actually translates into effects on the re-
lationships between societies or countries, which may range from full scale war to neu-
tral behavior to major cooperation. 
D r i v e r s  of  w a t e r  a v a i l a b i l i t y  
Water supply in a given watershed depends on the hydro-meteorological setting and 
geographic characteristics, such as precipitation patterns, evaporation rates, aquifer 
recharge, soil characteristics, and drainage to the sea. These are affected by climate 
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change. On the other hand, socio-economic variables like economic development, de-
mographic change, water-related infrastructure, and the institutional setting in a 
given river basin drive water demand and water-related investments. 
Of course, both demand and supply need to remain balanced. Trends in liveli-
hoods such as population growth and changes in human needs have a profound influ-
ence on the amount of water withdrawn in a given geographic location (Gassert et al. 
2013). The technical potential to withdraw and store water and the economic setting 
with regard to water use govern the degree to which countries can actually fulfill their 
own water needs and thus the level of water stress experienced by the given riparian. 
W a t e r  s t r e s s  a n d  w a t e r  s ec u r i t y  
Human perceptions and values determine whether the amount of water allocated to 
a riparian is considered to be abundant, sufficient, or scarce. Different actors can 
have substantially differing perceptions, which may give rise to heated political de-
bates (Harris and Alatout 2010). Furthermore, water also has symbolic meanings, 
connecting water to religious ideas such as purity, or concepts of national develop-























































Figure 1:  The conceptual framework of  the water-security nexus. Source: Link, 
Scheffran, and Ide 2016. 
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It is not clear whether increasing water stress and insufficient supply raise se-
curity concerns. This depends on the agents involved and their value perceptions, 
individual vulnerabilities, and security concepts applied. The security dimensions in 
the framework range from concerns about individual human security to national se-
curity threats to risks for international relations (Zeitoun 2011). Water stress can 
drive political decisions or discourses that aim at increasing water availability to re-
duce potential dissatisfaction and security concerns. There are numerous examples 
of research on the securitization of water, in which the amounts of water allocated 
to the riparians, water development projects, or the causes of water problems have 
led to heavy disputes among politicians, scientists, engineers, and local people 
(Murtinho et al. 2013; Waintraub 2009). 
C o nf l i c t i v e  a n d  c o o p e r a t i v e  h u m a n  r es p o n s e s  a n d  s o c i a l  
i n t e r a c ti o n s  
The third part of the framework addresses the collective responses and social inter-
actions to the given state of water security, which may lead to either conflict or co-
operation. The perception of water scarcity, together with increasing levels of inse-
curity and the securitization of water, can create an environment that is dominated 
by fear, anger, and hostilities, increasing the likelihood of onset of violent conflict 
(Stetter et al. 2011). Depending on the reply to such conflictive behavior, a self-rein-
forcing cycle of violence may ensue. 
Generally, the escalation of conflicts due to water stress requires not only on the 
motivation of the agents but also on their capabilities and opportunities to act. There 
are only some examples in the literature, in which a considerably weaker party en-
gaged in violent conflict nonetheless (Assies 2003). Climate change may cause the 
overall water availability to increase in some parts of the world (e. g. due to glacial 
melting or altered rainfall patterns). This may relieve some of the pressures of water 
demand, creating new chances for cooperation on water. In this context, it is im-
portant to note that the motivation and opportunity for cooperation (or conflict) are 
the product of social interaction (Ide and Fröhlich 2015) that is shaped considerably 
by securitization, identity constructions, and politics of scale. 
Cooperation can only be achieved if stakeholders recognize their options that 
may reduce water stress or increase their economic welfare (Norman, Bakker, and 
Cook 2012). If people affected by water stress do not act, water issues remain neutral 
(i. e. they are neither conflictive nor cooperative) as they remain below a critical 
threshold and thus do not lead to extraordinary responses. 
In transboundary watersheds, the political institutions of the riparians have a pro-
found influence on whether water scarcity leads to conflict or cooperation. They have 
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the ability to mitigate possible disputes before they escalate into violent conflicts 
(Gizelis and Wooden 2010; Tir and Stinnett 2012). Basinwide agreements or adaptation 
measures offer additional chances for cooperation than individual riparian’s responses 
at the country level, which may become particularly important if environmental con-
ditions become strained under climate change (Pelt and Swart 2011). However, current 
water management schemes in transboundary river systems are generally only bilat-
eral (Mirumachi 2015). 
Lin k a g e s  w it h in  t h e  fr a m e w o r k  
There are interactions and feedbacks between the three compartments of this frame-
work of the water-security nexus that can affect conflict or cooperation through dif-
ferent pathways. The value-security dimension is at the center of this scheme, con-
necting the supply-demand balance, which is based on the given hydrological set-
ting, with the resulting societal responses, either leading to conflict or cooperation. 
The links between the compartments are determined by the political setting. Water 
security and securitization discourses interact mutually with the vulnerabilities to 
water scarcity and to conflict, regardless of the causal relationship between the two 
(Link, Scheffran, and Ide 2016). 
Matters are further complicated by the fact that actions to facilitate cooperation 
on water at the international scale may create a conflictive reaction at the national or 
subnational scale (Norman, Bakker, and Cook 2012). Water management solutions 
at the national scale tend to more readily lead to conflict whereas solutions at the 
watershed level or at the subnational scale are more likely to create cooperation (Feit-
elson and Fischhendler 2009; Harris and Alatout 2010). An example is the Jonglei 
channel in the Nile River Basin, which was a cooperative effort between the countries 
of Egypt and Sudan that led to intrastate conflict within Sudan that eventually eased 
the secession of South Sudan (Mason et al. 2009). 
Despite all these complications the framework allows for a systematic assessment 
of water-related conflict and cooperation in transboundary river systems. In the fol-
lowing, this framework is applied to the Nile River Basin, which essentially supplies 
Northeast Africa with water and that is expected to experience increasing water stress 
due to possibly unfavorable changes in meteorological patterns due to climate change 
with concurrent increases in population and continuing economic development, lead-
ing to considerable growth in regional water demand. 
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C a s e  s t u d y :  T h e  N i l e  R i v e r  
Northeast Africa and the Nile River Basin have been one of the research foci of the 
Research Group Climate Change and Security. The Nile River Basin is one of the re-
gions that can be considered a climate hot spot and it is likely that altered environ-
mental conditions will have an effect on the likelihood of conflict onset (Scheffran, 
Link, and Schilling 2012). With regard to water allocation, based on scenarios of 
change in water allocation, an agent-based model of the main riparian countries was 
developed that simulates possible strategies to meet individual countries’ goals of 
water supply (Link and Scheffran 2019). In general, research results point to a sub-
stantial increase in water stress and additional societal pressures in the coming dec-
ades, which necessitates new and innovative water allocation schemes if conflicts 
among riparians are to be avoided. 
Water availability in times of climate change: The Nile River is the principal water 
source for more than 230 million people in the region (Nile Basin Initiative 2013). 
Based on the current trend, more than 300 million people are expected to live in the 
Nile River Basin in the late 2020s. The downstream countries are particularly de-
pendent on the water from the river as there are practically no other water sources 
in the country (Link et al. 2012). Currently, approximately 85 % of the water in Egypt 
originates in the Ethiopian Highlands and flows through the Blue Nile (Arsano 2010). 
However, Ethiopia now increases its own water use substantially, culminating in the 
construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam, which will withhold an amount of wa-
ter equivalent to the annual flow of the Blue Nile from the downstream countries 
during the time period when the reservoir of the dam is filled (Bastawesy 2014). So 
far, Egypt can use the share of water allocated to Sudan in the 1959 Nile water agree-
ment, which Sudan does not utilize for itself. But with Sudanese water demand 
growing concurrently as well, the remaining share for Egypt is likely to stagnate at 
best (Taha 2010), making it difficult for Egypt to meet its own goals. 
It has to be noted that the overall amount of water available in the Nile River sys-
tem critically depends on the long-term development of rainfall amounts in the Ethio-
pian Highlands. Climate models are still inconclusive about the trend of precipitation 
in the upstream countries of the Nile (Stocker et al. 2014). In the recent past, the flow 
in the White Nile has decreased while there has been an increase in the Blue Nile 
(Bushara and Abdelrahim 2010) but it is unclear if this trend will hold up. Further un-
certainties may arise from changes in evaporation in the Sudd Swamps in South Su-
dan, where the flow velocity of the river is substantially lower than in the rest of the 
river system. 
Water-security discourses in the Nile River Basin: The uncertainty associated with the 
development of river flow rates and the concurrent increasing demand in all riparian 
countries makes it harder for the individual countries to meet their own water needs. 
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If public perception or the views of political decision makers suggest that the na-
tional security is threatened because of an insecure water supply, they may turn to 
protective (conflictive) measures to secure their own interests. The people may pres-
sure the governments to take a tougher stance on water issues, thus making cooper-
ative solutions harder to achieve (Feitelson 2002). The situation is aggravated if har-
vest failures, insufficient sanitation, declines in water quality or increasing food 
prices adversely affect human livelihoods (Deligiannis 2012), giving rise to the possi-
bility of uprisings such as the Arab Spring in 2011. At present, Egypt feels particularly 
challenged by the emancipation of the upstream countries who have formed initial 
coalitions to secure their own interests against the still-hydro hegemon Egypt. When 
the Grand Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia is brought into service, this will substan-
tially shift the power relationships between the three main riparians of the Nile River 
(Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia) in favor of the upstream region, making it necessary to 
devise new agreements between the riparians to avoid an intensification of water-
related disputes (Link and Scheffran 2015). 
Conflictive and cooperative interactions among riparians: The increasing vulnerability 
of the downstream countries may cause them to take unilateral actions to secure 
their share of the Nile waters, thus facilitating the onset of new water-related con-
flicts (Link et al. 2012). This tendency is countered by a growing effort to increase the 
combined adaptive capacity of the riparians by fostering cooperative measures. 
However, there are also developments that are complicating matters: the construc-
tion of the Grand Renaissance Dam will lead to a substantial strengthening of the 
Ethiopian bargaining position in the region (Link and Scheffran 2015), which is likely 
to force Egypt to give up its hydro-hegemonial status (Gebreluel 2014). Furthermore, 
cooperative projects that have been launched in the past such as the Jonglei Channel 
have turned out to be inadequate and have led to increased tensions within the coun-
try of Sudan instead of fostering cooperation, ultimately resulting in the failure of 
the project (Mason et al. 2009). 
Nonetheless, the institutional basis for basinwide cooperation has been established 
with the founding of the Nile Basin Initiative. Cooperative projects in the Nile River 
Basin have received substantial external financial support from e. g. the USA and the 
World Bank, i. e. agents who have a strong interest in cooperation in the Nile River 
Basin mostly for economic reasons (Paisley and Henshaw 2013). One key project of the 
Nile Basin Initiative has been the drafting of a Cooperative Framework Agreement that 
has already been signed by six riparians and has been ratified by three. 
Linkages within the water-security nexus: The variable climate conditions in the Nile 
River Basin already pose a considerable challenge to water security. This challenge is 
likely to substantially grow in the next few decades. Even a favorable development of 
overall water availability in the river system may be inadequate to meet the strongly 
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growing demand for water, particularly in the downstream countries (Link et al. 
2012), further increasing the already high vulnerability to climate change in Egypt 
and Sudan (Brooks, Adger, and Kelly 2005). The Arab Spring has caused the eco-
nomic and political destabilization of Egypt, reducing its capacity to properly ad-
dress its water problems. The transition from a quasi-hegemonial system to a state 
with three more or less equally powerful riparians (Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia) in the 
region may create new chances for durable cooperation in the Nile River Basin as it 
will become necessary to negotiate and sign new fundamental agreements on the al-
location of water and energy from hydropower in the region. 
M o d e l i n g  of  p o s s i b l e  w a t e r  a l l o c a t i o n  s c h e m e s  
The interactions of the main riparians of the Nile River Basin with regard to fulfilling 
their own water needs can be simulated in a simulation model that focuses on four 
key riparians (Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda). The countries may invest finan-
cial resources in strategies to increase water supply, make water use more efficient, 
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Figure 3:  Total investments into water resources (first panel),  investments into 
the acquisition of  additional water resources (second panel), water 
supply (third panel),  and water consumption (fourth panel) in each 
country. No te: T he thick so lid lin es denot e t he c as e of  a cli mate change 
induced overall  increase of  w ater resources of  20 % b y the end of the 
simul at ion p eriod,  the d as hed li ne a decrease of 20 %. The lin es wi th 
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engage in cooperative measures, or threaten neighboring riparians to use less water 
(who may then resist that threat). Figure 2 shows a scheme of possible interactions. 
Interactions between the countries are simulated for a time period of two dec-
ades, in which the overall water availability in the river system either increases or 
decreases due to effects of climate change. Link and Scheffran (2019) provide a de-
tailed model description and simulation results for an extended model version that 
focuses on five countries. 
The results show that the countries’ strategies are highly dependent on the long-
term trend of overall water availability. Investments are intensified in times of increas-
ing water scarcity (Fig. 3, first panel). The marked increase in total investments for 
Egypt in the scenario of an expansion of water availability is caused by the particularly 
pronounced growth of water demand in this scenario that is attempted to be met. 
Since water use is already close to total supply, additional growth causes an increase in 
consumption costs, leading to such uncharacteristic trend in total investments. 
The oscillations in Egyptian investments into new water resources are related to 
switches between cooperative and conflictive strategies (Figure 3, second panel). The 
fact that investment costs are much higher in times of conflict leads to a decline in 
the incentive to threaten and makes the country turn towards cooperation instead. 
In case of a more pronounced difference in unit costs between conflictive and coop-
erative strategies, Egypt would refrain from the conflictive strategy as there would 
be too little reward for the effort put in. 
The expansion of water supply generally follows the underlying climate scenar-
ios (Figure 3, third panel). Without climate change, there is hardly any expansion, as 
this would be fairly expensive to realize. In contrast, the climate effect is much more 
pronounced: if there is more water available in the Nile River Basin, supply can grow 
substantially without great efforts while it shrinks more than can be offset by invest-
ments into any new resources if water generally becomes even scarcer in times of 
climate change. However, consumption in the upstream countries is largely unaf-
fected by climate trends (Figure 3, fourth panel), mainly because water use is initially 
quite low and water goals are substantially higher. So investments are made regard-
less of the overall development of water availability. Consumption in Egypt is much 
more sensitive to changes in the hydrological system and any negative changes in 
environmental conditions are practically impossible to offset even by massive invest-
ments into the expansion of water infrastructure. 
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S u m m a r y  a n d  c o n c l u s i o n s  
The assessments regarding water allocation in times of changing environmental 
conditions show that the water-security nexus consists of numerous complex inter-
actions and that there are not merely simple relationships. In the past, water con-
flicts have often not only had an environmental and an economic dimension – very 
often other aspects such as culture and religion have been important, highlighting 
the vital role of water for people in transboundary river systems all over the world. 
Water stress is likely to increase as a consequence of the joint effects of climate 
change, population growth, economic development, and growing inequities in wa-
ter distribution. This may give rise to new conflicts as disagreements among ripari-
ans on water-related issues mount. 
The conceptual framework of the water-security nexus considers the important 
security pathways and reflects the diversity of water conflicts for all possible spatial 
extents. Not only does it look at the physical conditions for water disputes, it also 
addresses the possibility of feedbacks between social change and the environmental 
system, the role of institutions affecting water use, and possible strategies to deal 
with growing water scarcity. This framework can be translated into agent-based re-
search models to study the effects of concrete scenarios of environmental change on 
the ability of individual riparians of transboundary river systems to meet their own 
desired goals of water consumption. 
Assessments of water-related conflicts indicate that the actual distribution of wa-
ter is rarely the key issue for water disputes. Often, divergent political views are chan-
neled into concurrent struggles for hegemonial power, energy production, the mainte-
nance of water quality, and the preservation of societal values. Many transboundary 
conflicts that also involve water could not be solved by merely increasing the overall 
amount of water available to the conflict parties (Bichsel 2009), as is prominently the 
case in the water conflict between Israel and Palestine that could not be resolved de-
spite substantial increases in water availability from wastewater recycling and desali-
nation (Aviram, Katz, and Shmueli 2014). Instead, the resolution of water conflicts also 
requires the recognition of the associated political, economic, societal, and cultural 
settings and discourses. Recent research on water conflicts has increasingly focused 
on the latter, broadening our understanding of these parts of the water-security nexus 
that will hopefully facilitate the increasingly successful mediation of water conflicts de-
spite the additional challenges arising from the impacts of climate change. 
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